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Sovereign Justice in Precolonial Maritime Asia
The Case of the Mayor’s Court of Bombay, 1726–1798
GAGAN D. S. SOOD*
Introduction
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, remarkable developments in the
realm of law were witnessed throughout the world. They expressed and paved the
way for a new type of dispensation. For those parts of Asia and the Middle East with
a substantial European presence, the legitimate rules, principles, and procedures
for resolving disputes were progressively assimilated into systems of state-sanc-
tioned legal pluralism.1 The process—at once gradual, charged, and punctuated—
coincided with the initial consolidation of European imperial dominance and the
emergence of Europe’s modern global empires.2
Though these changes in the realm of law date from the nineteenth century, the
European presence there had long preceded them. This was perhaps most notable
in maritime Asia.3 The Europeans in this region tended to cluster in their factories
or in certain quarters of the towns and cities dotting the Indian Ocean rim.
Notwithstanding differences between, say, a Mocha and an Aceh in size, location,
and form of government, all these settlements had one quality in common: each
was able to profit from the traffic conducted along the coast or across the high
seas. As for the sovereign justice on offer, the dispensation that governed it in early
modern times was far removed from its later analogue. This stemmed in large part
from the rationale and basis for the European presence. In particular, Europeans
could not dominate maritime Asia’s provincial and imperial powers, especially those
located inland, and the great majority of those arriving from western Europe intend-
ed to return as soon as possible; despite some involvement in racketeering and
other forms of surplus extraction—famously in attempts to introduce and enforce a
system of passports in maritime transport and travel—their interests were mainly
commercial, oriented towards trade and shipping; the indigenous populations
remained on the whole large and resilient; and many of the skills and techniques
vested in livelihoods long associated with the region retained their primacy. As a
result, the only realistic option for Europeans in maritime Asia was to reconcile
themselves to the prevailing order. And this they did, with most of the region’s fun-
damentals, not least in the realm of law, continuing to develop along what were
essentially indigenous lines.4
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The situation was to be transformed, however, from the turn of the nineteenth
century. Changes were now occurring not just under a previously unknown dispen-
sation, but also under one whose reach was truly global. In simple outline, a novel,
broadly positivistic approach to the physical, biological, and human worlds was
given impetus by sovereignty that was increasingly being recast as territorial state-
hood (to be reinforced later on in the century by emerging notions of the survival of
the fittest and a civilising mission). These were elements in an altered way of being,
of how man might—and should—relate to his surroundings, near and far.5 In the
judicial sphere, the new ontology revealed itself as moves towards what have been
labelled standardisation, codification, universalisation, and centralisation.6 These
moves entailed a loss of diversity in, as well as greater rigidity of, the legitimate
rules, principles, and procedures deployed in forums to resolve disputes. Europe
itself was certainly not spared this process.7 But the consequences were especially
acute for those parts of Asia and the Middle East on the cusp of colonisation
because of the differing provenances of their pre-existing ideas and practices. The
resulting incommensurabilities meant that these could not be meshed with those
emanating from Europe. Instead, traditions were “invented” and customs “discov-
ered.”8
The argument is a familiar one; it is generally accepted that developments in the
realm of law from the start of the nineteenth century were constitutive for the colo-
nial polities in Asia and the Middle East in their later, more mature phases. This is
above all because of their bearing on identity and, by extension, on relationships
across ethnic, religious, class, gender, and racial boundaries. Familiar as this argu-
ment is—and we now have a wealth of scholarship on “colonial law”9—the nature
of these developments as a whole still eludes us. One of the main reasons for this
is the absence of sufficiently fine-grained knowledge of what prevailed immediately
beforehand. The situation is not helped by the prevalence of a state-centric and
modernist outlook in historical scholarship on law. Such an outlook can do little to
check the tendency to project back into the past what appears “precolonial” or
“non-colonial” in the nineteenth century (or after), when the process of colonisation
was already well under way. The possibility of unwitting anachronisms thus rears its
head, which is problematic to say the least.10
In this article, I hope to avoid such anachronisms. I do so by focusing on the
Mayor’s Court of Bombay, a sovereign forum for resolving disputes in the eigh-
teenth century. In giving a detailed description and analysis of this forum, my hope
is that this article will contribute to establishing a baseline for determining what
remained the same and what was transformed over the following century. It also
stands to contribute to our understanding of the principal mechanisms responsible
for the observed continuities and changes. These reasons are the principal justifi-
cation for a comprehensive account of the constitution of the Mayor’s Court of
Bombay, its jurisdiction, the logistics of prosecuting a suit in the forum, and the
laws on the basis of which decisions were reached.
There are four distinct contexts in which this specific forum may be interpreted
as having played a meaningful role in the eighteenth century, each characterised by
its own historiographical concerns: the larger polity of which Bombay was part,
extending along the coast and into western India; the general phenomenon of early
modern European expansion, settlement, and colonisation; Europe’s overseas
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empires and its great chartered trading companies; and maritime Asia. The Mayor’s
Court of Bombay lies at the intersection of these four contexts. While there is value
in treating these contexts together, not least because of their historical bearing on
one another, there is also value in treating them separately. In the present article, I
adopt the latter approach, with maritime Asia being my main concern. This is rea-
sonable in view of Bombay’s growing importance to the Arabian Sea area and,
more broadly, to the world of the Indian Ocean rim as the eighteenth century pro-
gressed.11 By the middle of the eighteenth century, Bombay had eclipsed Surat as
the Arabian Sea area’s greatest entrepôt. Many of those engaged in regional-scale
trade, finance, and shipping developed strong ties with the port city so as to take
advantage of its resources and the new opportunities on offer. They invested in its
most profitable sectors and availed themselves of its facilities, employing agents to
oversee their interests or maintain partnerships with local residents. As increasing
numbers from abroad were drawn into Bombay’s orbit, a variety of communities
and corporations adopted it as one of their principal seats of operations. By virtue
of the port city’s position as an important hub in a dense commercial and commu-
nications network, its residents as a group were conversant with—and arguably
influential in shaping—many of the standards that framed maritime activities
marked by large distances and long silences. This is why an account of the law
applied in suits heard in Bombay’s Mayor’s Court, and of the forum’s day-to-day
functioning, provides us with insights into the rules, principles, and procedures for
resolving disputes that were dispersed throughout maritime Asia.
But the Mayor’s Court of Bombay was not the only one of its kind; there were
others—and other kinds of forums, too—in which disputes were typically resolved.
So we have the courts of the sha¯hbandar (or syahbandar) at Pegu in Burma, of the
Parsi pancha¯yats in Gujarat, of the “traders” (tujja¯r) residing in Basra, and of the
city quarters (wijken) of Dutch Batavia. This set of forums constituted what might
be described as a self-regulating legal regime. By this I mean that, despite the
absence of an authoritative centre, they interacted with one another in a fashion
which was coherent and stable, analogous to law in the Islamicate world12 or to the
lex mercatoria in Europe.13 Disseminated and sustained by dense networks, there
was shared knowledge among those active in maritime Asia about where and with
whom lay the authority to resolve disputes. This was seldom determined in territo-
rial terms or in terms of subjecthood, or even residence. Rather, the most pertinent
attributes were the character of the transaction at hand and the ethnic or confes-
sional background of the litigants. The latter was especially salient given the diver-
sity endemic to the region. Due to the coercive and informational constraints on
sovereign governance in the period, there was no real alternative to the great major-
ity of disputes being resolved in forums located beyond the sovereign purview.
Though the totality of the applicable law varied from forum to forum, there was
nevertheless enough comity between them to enable mutual recognition and to
sustain the expectation that a forum’s decision would be upheld.
The picture described in this article is thus bottom-up and decentred (or, perhaps
more accurately, polycentric). The introduction of sovereign forums does not fun-
damentally alter it. These embraced a law which, at a minimum and in practice, did
not contradict that embraced by other forums, sovereign or otherwise. To this
extent, sovereign forums were functionally interchangeable, and gave rise to the
GAGAN D. S. SOOD48
possibility of “forum shopping.” Notwithstanding the fact that relatively few disputes
were resolved in sovereign forums, they were integral to the legal regime and nec-
essary for maintaining its potency. On the one hand, they were an institutional man-
ifestation of sovereignty in maritime Asia. This accorded with the widely held con-
viction that the sovereign was the ultimate temporal guarantor of justice and the
social order within his polity.14 On the other hand, there was value in the knowledge
that legitimate physical force, normally delegated to officials manning the forums
that dispensed their sovereign’s justice, was potentially available to draw upon, even
if mainly for exemplary purposes. Both these features of the legal regime of
maritime Asia find expression in the Mayor’s Court of Bombay.
So an examination of this specific forum contributes to our understanding of the
legal regime of maritime Asia in the eighteenth century. Perhaps less obviously, it
also contributes to our understanding of the transformations that started to gather
pace from the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is because sovereign
forums such as the Mayor’s Court of Bombay furnished (in retrospect) a core mech-
anism through which these transformations were crystallised. The very existence of
the Mayor’s Court of Bombay accustomed those indigenous to the region to the
idea—and practice—of recourse to sovereign justice presided over by Europeans.
Of course, down to the end of the eighteenth century at least, the fact that this jus-
tice was nominally dispensed by Europeans was of no practical relevance since their
justice conformed to the norms embodied in sovereign forums throughout mar-
itime Asia, European and non-European. But in view of what was to happen in the
coming decades, the growing popularity of specifically European sovereign forums
had profound unintended consequences.
I return to this issue in the conclusion. For the time being, the point to note is
that these transformations paralleled the dissolution of the legal regime of maritime
Asia. To the degree that rupturing took place in the history of Asia and the Middle
East from the turn of the nineteenth century, the dissolution of maritime Asia’s legal
regime is part and parcel of this process. So to get to grips with the nature and
scope of this rupturing requires us to get to grips with, among other things, the real-
ities of the legal regime that preceded it. This article moves us towards that goal by
recapturing the details of the Mayor’s Court of Bombay, which was integral to mar-
itime Asia in the eighteenth century. It is the survival of the forum’s administrative
and legal records—copies of which are today preserved in Mumbai and London—
that make such an account possible.
The Mayor’s Court in Theory and Practice
The start of Britain’s relationship with the Arabian Sea area may be dated from the
early decades of the seventeenth century. This was the moment when the English
East India Company founded its factory in Surat, western India’s gateway to the
high seas. Not long after the transfer of control over Bombay in 1688 from the
English crown to the Company, the island became the headquarters for its interests
in the area. Alongside Calcutta and Madras, it was designated as one of the three
“Presidency” settlements in India under Company rule. As a result, the Mayor’s
Court was a fixture in Bombay from its establishment in 1728 until its abolition in
1798.
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The law that the Mayor’s Court administered, its jurisdiction, and its organisation
were formally defined in a royal charter issued to the Company in 1726. This was
amended in 1753 so as to correct perceived deficiencies. The two charters give us
a reasonable sense of how officials in London expected the Mayor’s Court to oper-
ate, and their perception of maritime Asia from a juristic standpoint.15 The 1726
charter set up a municipal “corporation” in Bombay.16 This consisted of a mayor
and nine aldermen. They formed a court of record—the Mayor’s Court—in which
three were required for a quorum. The mayor and seven of the aldermen were to
be native subjects of the English crown; the remaining two aldermen could be sub-
jects of any other sovereign in friendly relations with England. A mayor’s tenure was
for one year and the aldermen’s either for life or for as long as they were domiciled
in Bombay. Each year, the mayor and aldermen currently in post elected a new
mayor from among the existing aldermen. Vacancies among the aldermen were
filled by those who qualified as local residents. Bombay’s government could remove
an alderman from his office on a complaint being made against him. The dismissed
alderman had a right, however, to have this decision reviewed by the king-in-coun-
cil in England.
The Mayor’s Court was the court of first instance in all civil and testamentary suits
involving European residents of Bombay and its subordinate factories, the most
important of which was in Surat. Judgements handed down by it could be appealed
to the court of the governor and council of Bombay. The latter’s decision was final
in cases worth less than 1,000 pagodas (approximately Rs. 3,000). For those whose
value was 1,000 pagodas or more, litigants had a further right of appeal to the king-
in-council in England. Criminal suits in Bombay did not fall within the Mayor’s
Court’s jurisdiction. They were heard instead by the governor and the five senior
members of his council. Each was simultaneously a justice of the peace, and
together they formed a court of record that enjoyed powers equivalent to the
English courts of “oyer and terminer” and “gaol delivery.”
As for the law that the Mayor’s Court was supposed to administer, this is not
explicitly stated in the 1726 charter. It only required the court to “render its
decisions according to justice and right.”17 But as the preceding charter had
specified that the governor and council base their decisions on English law,
we may assume that on the new charter being issued the Mayor’s Court was
expected to apply the common and statutory law of England as it stood in 1726.
Thereafter, the forum was permitted to diverge from English law through mecha-
nisms prescribed in the charter. The governor and council were empowered to
make by-laws and decree rules for the better governance of Bombay, and to
impose penalties on residents. These had to be “agreeable to reason” and not
“contrary to the laws and statutes of England.”18 They also needed approval from
the Company’s directors in London before they could come into force. It was also
expected that the procedures followed by the Mayor’s Court would be modelled on
those of the common law courts of metropolitan England. To this end, each presi-
dency received from London a “Book of Instructions” and the “Method of
Proceedings.” These explained how a case ought to be prosecuted and provided
copies of the forms required to undertake civil suits, sessions trials, and probate
and administration work. The Company was given the task of ensuring that the
Mayor’s Court remained faithful to its charter. One check was the requirement
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that the records of the forum’s daily proceedings be scrutinised on an annual basis.
It quickly became apparent, however, that the 1726 charter was a triumph of
hope over experience; it was a naive attempt to transplant from England to a very
different setting a certain ideal of how such forums ought to be structured and
operate. In one sense, the charter was an exercise in make-believe, whose intend-
ed audience was more in London than in Bombay. Throughout the Mayor’s Court’s
existence, for example, no “Indian” was ever appointed to the bench, though the
charter made provision for this possibility. In another sense, the forum’s official pro-
visions were simply inappropriate for the situation in maritime Asia before the end
of the eighteenth century and the start of the consolidation of British rule. Its
judges, attorneys, servants, and clients responded by disregarding the charter when
it did not suit them. Of course, the egregious gap between practice and theory did
not go unnoticed by the Company. And so another royal charter was issued in 1753
to bring the forum in line with official policy.
This new charter was a modified version of the 1726 charter. Each of its major
amendments sought to resolve specific failings, as the Company saw it, in
Bombay’s judicial sphere. Three are of particular note. First, Bombay’s government
was given the final say in the appointment of the corporation’s mayor and alder-
men.19 This was prompted by the debilitating tension that had come to characterise
relations between the Mayor’s Court and the governor and council. The 1726 char-
ter had envisaged a forum largely free of interference by Bombay’s government.
Taking a literal interpretation, many of those who manned the forum sought to pre-
serve their autonomy, even at the risk of acting counter to the decisions of the gov-
ernment and council. This was a frequent source of conflict, much to the
Company’s irritation. By strengthening the executive and curtailing the independ-
ence of the Mayor’s Court, the Company hoped to legislate away what had become
a chronic feature of dealings between the two sides.
Second, the 1726 charter removed from the Mayor’s Court’s jurisdiction all suits
between those who were not European, unless the parties involved submitted them-
selves voluntarily to the forum’s authority. This echoed the original intention that the
Mayor’s Court be for Europeans alone. The intention, however, had been widely
flouted since its founding; it had regularly heard cases between litigants indigenous
to the region, normally in accordance with their own notions of justice. By stating
once again that the Mayor’s Court was a court of English law in which only English
law was applicable, it was hoped that non-Europeans would be dissuaded from
seeking its protection, choosing instead to resolve disputes among themselves as
they saw fit.
Third, the new charter set up a new forum, the court of requests. Its rationale was
to dispense cheap justice efficiently to all of Bombay’s residents in suits worth no
more than 5 pagodas, or about Rs. 15. It was established in recognition of the fact
that the Mayor’s Court could no longer handle the growth in litigation experienced
over the preceding years. To lighten its workload, petty disputes became the pre-
rogative of this subsidiary forum.
Jurisdiction, Law, and the Legal Regime
As with its 1726 predecessor, the hopes vested in the 1753 charter were not to be
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realised. The disjuncture between theory and practice was impervious to such
diktats from London; the Company’s idealised aims, coupled with reluctance to
acknowledge openly the traditions reigning in Bombay and maritime Asia, clashed,
on the one hand, with the practicalities of governing a diverse, mobile population
with reasonable fairness and efficiency, and, on the other, with the aspirations of the
Company’s merchant-officials and their indigenous associates to turn a profit of
their own. In this struggle, there could only ever be one victor. It also determined
the parameters of the ensuing debate: the jurisdiction of the Mayor’s Court, the laws
to which it adhered, its relationship to other forums, and the means of redress in
Bombay’s judicial sphere. This debate is of value for what it tells us about the real-
ities on the ground. It also begs the question: what are the sources that might allow
us to listen in on this debate? The answer clearly does not lie in the charters or the
correspondence exchanged between British officials based in London. A much
more promising source is the Diary of the Mayor’s Court.20 This is a record of the
formal proceedings of the forum. But it also contains the verbatim copies—often
complete—of the depositions entered by plaintiffs and defendants, and the tran-
scripts of interrogations of the witnesses called by the parties to the suit. In keeping
with the British practice—then and now—of motivating the judgement orally, only
the forum’s judgement is stated in the Diary; rarely do we find any indication of the
rationale behind the bench’s decisions. Even so, this Diary, augmented by person-
al and business correspondence and the published observations of local residents
and visitors, permits us to see beyond the ideals expressed by the charters and cap-
ture something of the Mayor’s Court’s true status and role in maritime Asia’s legal
regime.
The actual jurisdiction of the Mayor’s Court was delineated in different ways: one
was in terms of the qualifications required of would-be litigants for their case to be
heard by the forum; a second was in terms of its relationship to other forums capa-
ble of resolving disputes. By its charters, the Mayor’s Court at Bombay had sole
jurisdiction over all suits to which Europeans were party. No non-European could
be compelled to submit himself to its authority; indeed, this was officially discour-
aged. But a glance at the names of the defendants and plaintiffs who appeared
before the bench is enough to show that a wide spectrum of backgrounds was rep-
resented. It is true that the most numerous were British by origin. A significant pro-
portion, however, hailed from religious and ethnic communities indigenous to the
region. Prominent among them were Parsis, Gujarati baniya¯s, and Shi¯‘ i¯s; perhaps
surprisingly, Armenians were relatively few in number.
Whatever the charters might decree, residency per se does not seem to have
been a prime qualification for gaining access to the justice of the Mayor’s Court. As
noted in a memo received in the early 1760s from Madras’ government, the Mayor’s
Court there was willing to entertain any dispute over agreements wherever they were
originally contracted as long as the plaintiff was usually “resident within the jurisdic-
tion.”21 But even “Indian natives” who were not considered residents could access
the forum through the device of issuing “bona fide” bonds that transferred “the ben-
efit of the debt to an English subject [which then] may be accepted and lawfully put
in suit against an Indian native constantly resident within the limits of the jurisdic-
tion.”22 Stripping away the rhetoric, the evidence suggests that what really counted
in Madras was not residency—or subjecthood, ethnicity, or religion—but whether
GAGAN D. S. SOOD52
any judgement concerning the matter in dispute could be acted upon.23 And this
was true of Bombay, too. Though in obvious breach of their charters, the general
approach of both forums was to adapt themselves to the fact of their diverse and
expanding polities. This was driven by a desire on the part of their governing mer-
chant-officials to enrich their polities, for their own interests, if not the Company’s.
It is also why the same merchant-officials tried on occasion to limit the jurisdiction
of their principal sovereign forums to territories firmly under government control.
The consequences were predictable. The reluctance—or inability—of the Mayor’s
Court of Bombay to enforce judgements involving people or property located out-
side the Presidency encouraged litigants who feared its judgement would go against
them to migrate to places where its writ did not run.24 By the same token, plaintiffs
would urge the forum to speed up the process, trying to make it more difficult for
the defendant to abscond from Bombay with his property before the judgement was
issued.
The forum’s modest capacity to enforce its judgement in territories outside the
Company’s control did not, however, stem the growth in its popularity among the
region’s indigenous communities.25 This popularity dates from its very inception.
The records of the Mayor’s Court’s daily proceedings show that much of its work
had always involved disputes between non-Europeans, many of whom were not
Bombay residents. We may account for this by considering its reputation, and that
of Bombay’s government, within maritime Asia’s legal regime. Reputation mattered
because, for those in search of sovereign justice in the region, the Mayor’s Court of
Bombay was one of several possibilities. As transactions often involved people and
property with ties to more than one settlement, there were other forums available
in which sovereign justice was dispensed and which were potential substitutes for
Bombay’s Mayor’s Court. In these circumstances, popularity and reputation were
positively correlated to one another.
But even in Bombay itself, the Mayor’s Court was not free of competition. While
there was no alternative to it if one wanted justice in a sovereign forum specifically,
there were, of course, other kinds of justice available. By far the most important of
these in maritime Asia was offered in forums rooted in indigenous communities—
among the most well known being the Parsis, Armenians, and Chettiars—or in
occupational associations of, say, wholesale traders (tujja¯r) residing locally or
maha¯jans, a type of banker-creditor found throughout northern India. Whether
through arbitration or mediation, it is in forums like these that the great majority of
disputes were formally heard and resolved. Few of them, if any, were officially sanc-
tioned by the English crown or the Company’s Court of Directors; they existed
largely beyond the purview of Bombay’s European population. Nevertheless, they
were not ignored by those who manned the Mayor’s Court. On the contrary, the
Mayor’s Court was acknowledged in practice as belonging to a broader, self-regu-
lating legal regime, dimly perceived though it might have been. This acknowledge-
ment was at its most explicit in two commonplace situations: when the Mayor’s
Court would insist that an attempt be made to resolve the dispute through a mode
of “private arbitration” acceptable to all parties before it would consider hearing the
case; and when disputed facts at the heart of a case submitted to the Mayor’s Court
were referred to “private arbitration” before allowing it to progress any further.
Alongside this so-called private arbitration in communal or occupational forums,
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another very different kind of justice—akin to a ruler’s personal justice—was also
available. It was normally solicited through personal appeals to the governor of the
port city. As he occupied the sole office in Bombay invested with the aura of a sov-
ereign, his pronouncements could suffice to resolve disputes, among those living
in Bombay for sure, but also among those living elsewhere in maritime Asia. And
this might be done without reference to the Mayor’s Court (or indeed to any other
forum in the legal regime). A case in point is that of H.a¯j i¯ Baqi¯l. A Muslim resident
of Surat, he decided in 1739 to petition Stephen Law directly. Exhausted by his
failed efforts to reach acceptable terms with a pair of shipping brokers over the price
of a vessel, he wrote to Law in his capacity as the Governor of Bombay asking him
to adjudicate their dispute.26 In so doing, he simply bypassed the Mayor’s Court.
These possible alternatives to the Mayor’s Court suggest that there was a degree
of competition within maritime Asia’s legal regime for the business of justice. Since
self-regulation was the rule, such competition could make good sense; the constant
negotiation of the boundaries between the component elements of the legal regime
may plausibly have been a source of stability. But equally it could fuel local strug-
gles for power. John Grose observed this at first hand in Bombay in 1750. “Several
of the company’s servants,” he wrote, “named especially to fill the offices of the
mayor and aldermen of the mayor’s court, even though their jurisdiction was sub-
ordinate to the court of appeals, assumed to themselves such an authority and
independence as made the governor and council jealous of theirs being lessened,
or at least checked by it. This bred such feuds and dissensions, that several of the
members of the mayor’s court conceiving themselves aggrieved, quitted the serv-
ice, and repaired home to the company with their complaints.” As Grose saw it, the
cause for this was not the 1726 charter but failings in those who had been select-
ed for these offices. “The want of knowledge, the inexperience and aim at inde-
pendence in the appointed members of the several courts, rendered this accession
of authority a dangerous tool, in the hands of persons so disqualified for the exer-
cise of it: so that it is scarce a doubt, but the charter had been better not obtained,
than no better a provision have been made for its administration and maintenance.”
27 He may well have hoped that the reforms promulgated by the 1753 charter would
rectify these (in his view) grave problems. If so, then he was to be disappointed; the
business of justice carried on much the same as before.
While decrying the officials who manned Bombay’s Mayor’s Court, Grose also
admitted that the blame for their failures was not solely theirs.
The charter [of 1726], appointing the judges of Oyer and Terminer, the
mayor’s court, and the court of appeals, this last to consist of purely the
president and council, was only attended with a manuscript book of instruc-
tions; which, granting it was framed by the ablest lawyers in the kingdom,
could be but a very imperfect guidance to the gentlemen nominated to the
several judicial offices necessary to the execution thereof. These gentlemen
being, generally speaking, such as came very young out of their country,
bred up entirely in a mercantile way, and utterly unacquainted with the laws
of England, were in course liable to make great mistakes, especially in
cases of capital importance; and however their natural good sense and well-
meaning might make a shift in purely commercial cases to decide with
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tolerable equity, they could not but be greatly at a loss in those of a mixed
nature, or where it was necessary to pay a regard to the particular laws of
England.
Clearly, much of the blame for the current state of affairs in Bombay lay with the
Court of Directors in London. It was because of them that “no person had been sent
out with capacity or knowledge enough to put this new method of procedure into a
proper course, and to ascertain the limits of the several jurisdictions: so that the
charter was left in a manner to execute itself.”28
Grose was correct in his observation that no official working for the Mayor’s Court
was, or ever had been, a professional lawyer or judge. The fact of the matter was
that, throughout the forum’s seventy-year history, neither the mayor and aldermen
who determined the decisions, nor the clerks and other servants who kept it
running, nor the attorneys who argued their clients’ cases before the bench, had
systematic training or experience in substantive law of any kind, let alone English
law.29 Without the requisite knowledge or skills, the notion that the Mayor’s Court
applied English common and statute law was mere pretence.30 John Lambton, a
British attorney representing the Bengal-based merchant Mordecai Walker, was thus
perfectly entitled to state in 1743 that the Mayor’s Court was a “Court of Equity.”31
The statement was accepted without challenge both by the judges and Rupji
Dhanji, the opponent in the suit. It stands to reason that, if those responsible for
managing the forum were technically unqualified to administer the law as defined
in its charters, then those who sought its justice had even less of an idea of English
law and English common law courts. This was in practice as true of British litigants
as of the Bohras, baniya¯s, Portuguese, Arabs, and Parsis who often figure among
the plaintiffs and defendants.
In so far as the population indigenous to maritime Asia had any awareness of
English law, it was deemed of little or no relevance for prosecuting a case success-
fully in the Mayor’s Court. This is implied by litigants who sought retrials on the
grounds of their ignorance of the forum’s laws and procedures. S i¯kra¯n Hi¯rj i¯, a well-
known Hindu baniya¯ from Gujarat with interests scattered throughout the Arabian
Sea area, found himself mired in just this situation in 1771. S i¯kra¯n petitioned the
Mayor’s Court to reconsider his case against Thomas Mathewson, a British mer-
chant and Company supercargo. He justified his request on two grounds. First, he
claimed that new evidence had come to light that was of material relevance to the
case and would alter its facts in his favour. Second, he argued that, as a result of
bad counsel taken in good faith, he had unwittingly adopted a legal approach that
ran counter to his interests. This is why, for example, he had not responded to a bill
filed by Mathewson, “being such as he was persuaded and advised to, and not
knowing how material[l]y he might be affected thereby, being a stranger from a for-
eign country, ignorant of the language, and greatly unacquainted with the manner
of proceeding in this Hon[oura]ble Court, being brought up under a Government
entirely deferant from the English, and therefore ignorant of the laws of this coun-
try.”32 Is it thus surprising that he had made such elemental mistakes? Was it fair for
him to be held responsible for them? He pleaded for the Mayor’s Court and
Bombay’s government to show him mercy, assuring them that in any retrial he
would scrupulously observe the laws sanctioned by the forum. S i¯kra¯n Hi¯rj i¯ was
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obviously engaging in a spot of rhetorical gamesmanship. Nevertheless, he had
reason to be confident of a sympathetic hearing because, as he put it, the Mayor’s
Court is “notoriously fam’d for their mildness and equity in protecting the innocent,
and securing the injured from oppression, which he humbly prays and doubts not
he will experience in this cause and meet with all the indulgence these law may or
can admit of.”33 He placed stress on its reputation. This was eminently sensible
because of a reputation’s bearing on a forum’s broader influence in the region.
Though legal practice in the Mayor’s Court of Bombay diverged greatly from
both the common law courts of England and the spirit of its founding charters, this
did not translate into a loss of authority and capricious judgements. The Mayor’s
Court administered a set of rules and principles and obeyed procedures with which
its officials and clients were sufficiently conversant, and which were, more impor-
tantly, acceptable to them. These rules, principles, and procedures are what consti-
tuted its law. Key to their acceptability was that their source did not lie in England
but in maritime Asia. So we see the forum support prevailing customs. And we also
see it take pains to ensure its decisions were consonant with ambient notions of fair-
ness. In these circumstances, the courts and laws of England were rendered moot.
Because of the differences with the orders issued by the Company’s Directors in
London, many of the binding rules, principles, and procedures of the Mayor’s Court
were not written down but communicated orally and learnt through experience.
They evolved through a process of trial and error, generating a stable but protean
situation of which litigants and their attorneys were cognizant. Change could occur
in a number of ways. Perhaps the most common was through suits in which one
party advocated the establishment of a new precedent. The usual justification was
that current notions of “equity” demanded it. Of course, the judges had to balance
this principle against the authority of existing customs. The opposing party’s stock
response would be to remind the bench of the risks attending innovation. John
Lambton, a British attorney, argued the point with the assuredness and finesse of a
seasoned operator. “The defendant hath sufficiently confessed his contract,” he
deposed in 1743, “although he endeavours to evade it by reasons which this repli-
ant humbly hopes will have no weight in this Hon[oura]ble Court ... for if it is once
allowed that merchants shall recede from their contracts with humble submission
it would be introducing into this Hon[oura]ble Court a precedent of the most dan-
gerous consequences to trade and few merchants would escape feeling one time
or other its bad effects for persons desirous of relinquishing their bargain would
never want some seemingly plausible pretext to pursue that end.”34
Lambton’s sentiments echoed an earlier dispute that had pitted the Parsi Framji
Rustomji against the Gujarati Hindus Narayandas Tuckidas and Nathu Madowji. The
Hindu defendants begged
leave to observe that if five or six years after two Indian merchants have
adjusted their books and settled their accounts together according to the
customary method usually observed between them, one of them should
take it into his head to sue and vex the other on some of the heads so for-
merly adjusted by them both[,] the Def[endan]ts humbly submit whether
allowing such a suit would not be introducing into this Hon[oura]ble Court
a precedent of every ill consequence[;] and few Indian merchants of credit
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here according to the method (common to most of them) of settling their
accounts together could escape feeling the bad effects of it[,] for litigious
p[er]sons would never want plausable pretexts to call their correspondents
or partners to account for transactions a long time before adjusted between
them as in the instance of the present case.35
It is such evidence which buttresses the view that the law applied in the Mayor’s
Court had less to do with its charters or the instructions regularly dispatched from
London than with pertinent customs and an approach imbued with pragmatism.
This helps explain why litigants felt able to appeal to certain types of authorities over
others when making their case. In 1773, Rupji Dhanji was involved in a dispute with
a group of Bombay-based holders of respondentia bonds over the division of the
proceeds from the sale of a ship’s cargo on which both had a claim. Rupji Dhanji,
the ship’s owner, argued that his claim, arising from the credit he had extended for
the hire of his ship, ought to have precedence over that of the respondentia bond-
holders. He referred to passages “in the law books and in the books of commerce”
in which, he asserted, there were “innumerable” examples that supported his posi-
tion.36 In his deposition, he quoted part of the entry on “freight” in Malachy
Postlethwayt’s Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce.37 Popular handbooks
like this contained a distilled version of the lex mercatoria. By this period, however,
these handbooks carried little weight in English common law courts. Rupji Dhanji’s
opponents in this dispute highlighted just this point in trying to undermine his posi-
tion. They argued that Postlethwayt’s Universal Dictionary had as much to do with
the forum’s substantive law as “the opinion of any lawyer on point of law can be of
the same force and validity as an act of Parliament.”38 The Mayor’s Court ultimate-
ly decided in favour of Rupji Dhanji.39 Though far from proof—impossible where the
rationale for the judgements is not stated explicitly—the suggestion is that the
forum was sympathetically inclined towards the lex mercatoria and its associated
principles.
Fairness was a leitmotiv among those indigenous to the region who were propo-
nents of the justice dispensed by the Mayor’s Court. Even after making allowance
for formula and exaggeration, there is a ring of sincerity about Babu Lambatia, a
Muslim plaintiff, when he noted in 1747 that he chose to air his grievances in the
forum because of its “vaunted equitty and justice.”40 Its purported “equity and jus-
tice” was frequently contrasted by non-European plaintiffs with the unpredictable
and arbitrary conduct of other forums. In the 1740s, Narayandas Tuckidas and
Nathu Madhuji sought to resolve their differences with H.a¯j i¯ Baqi¯l through arbitration
in an occupational forum. But when the referees announced their judgement, they
refused to abide by it, claiming that, unlike those of the Mayor’s Court, theirs was
“rash, irregular and unadvisedly given contrary to all justice and equity and in man-
ifest wrong and oppression.”41
Internal Organisation
The available sources that touch on the Mayor’s Court tend to gloss over its inner
workings. There are, however, a few exceptions. One of these is the forum’s “table
of fees,” which provides a detailed breakdown of the official costs incurred by par-
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ties to a suit. Such tables were occasionally copied and entered into the daily pro-
ceedings. I have come across two such tables, dating from 1771 and 1775.42 To the
best of my knowledge, the Mayor’s Court Diary does not contain any tables of fees
prior to 1771. Thereafter, they appear irregularly at intervals of several years.
The tables of fees are invaluable documents for envisaging the Mayor’s Court as
it actually was. They provide information on the type and number of officials and
servants employed by the forum, and the external institutions closely associated
with it; the functional relationship between its posts and their status within the over-
all hierarchy; the principal duties attached to the individual posts; and the channels
of communication through which instructions and information were transmitted
and received. The tables have, at the same time, major limitations. They provide no
biographical data on the individuals who occupied the forum’s various posts and tell
us almost nothing about the order in which tasks were performed. These tables of
fees are best viewed as providing a snapshot of part of the inner machinery of the
Mayor’s Court.
The tables show that the most crucial, albeit unsung and practically invisible,
employee in the forum was the “register” (that is, registrar). Hardly ever noted while
a suit was in progress,43 he was the administrative and informational linchpin of the
Mayor’s Court.44 It was through him that all its documented business was initiated
and monitored, from the official commencement of the litigation to the enforce-
ment of its verdict. That his role was pivotal for the forum’s operations may be
demonstrated in two different ways. Every official act was accompanied by a written
order that was either issued to or by the register. In this sense, the institution
revolved around him, explaining why he had a stake in most of its everyday activi-
ties. From the perspective of the fees that he earned, the register’s duties were by
far the most wide-ranging and varied of all the Mayor’s Court’s staff. Whereas oth-
ers had no more than six—two or three was the usual number—officially-sanc-
tioned activities for which litigants could be charged, the register collected fees for
twenty-one distinct functions, ranging from reading and filing bills of complaints, to
precepts issued to the sheriff under the seal of the Mayor’s Court, and displaying
public notices in town.45
The other officers and servants of the forum may be distinguished by their rela-
tionship to the litigants and by their ethnic background. At one end of the spectrum,
there were those who had no direct official contact with litigants while the case was
in progress. This restriction appears to have been confined to the bench, on which
sat Bombay’s mayor and aldermen. Whatever the forum’s charter might declare,
these officials were invariably selected from among those of Bombay’s residents
who were British-born and -bred. As most had been in the Company’s employ for
many years, there often existed multiple personal and business ties between judges
and the litigants appearing before them; they were embedded in a dense web of
relationships that spanned maritime Asia. While this had an undoubted influence on
the prosecution of a suit and the forum’s final judgement, it was not officially noted
or condoned. The main duties of a judge were to hear and deliberate on cases
made on behalf of the litigants by their court-sanctioned attorneys; to study depo-
sitions, with any appended documents, entered by the litigants; and to issue orders
that were recorded by the register and then communicated by him to the appropri-
ate individuals or committees.
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At the other end of the spectrum, we have servants or officials whose primary
function was to mediate between the Mayor’s Court, on the one hand, and litigants
and other outsiders, on the other; or to put into effect the forum’s orders concern-
ing the litigants. Attorneys were the most prominent among such intermediaries.
Almost without fail British natives, they had to be officially appointed before they
were allowed to style themselves attorneys. Though it is not clear whether they had
to fulfil any formal requirements, residence in Bombay was in practice a necessary
condition. All litigants were obliged to appoint and retain an attorney so as to pros-
ecute their complaint or to defend themselves against accusations that had been
lodged with the Mayor’s Court. The chief role of the attorney was to represent his
client in court, and to provide him with information and advice on the substantive
and procedural laws then currently prevailing. This role manifested itself in several
ways. The attorney drew up petitions and rejoinders in the correct form and man-
ner, and deposed them on behalf of his client. This was always done through the
register. The attorney was expected to attend court and plead his client’s case
before the bench on the day “the parties join issue,” the client being barred from
doing so in person. Finally, clients looked to their attorneys to guide them on the
best strategy to follow to achieve a successful outcome. Even if their knowledge of
the forum’s substantive law was precarious, they were normally well-versed in han-
dling the procedural aspects of a suit, which could be of far greater significance in
the final reckoning.46
The duties vested in several of the posts in the Mayor’s Court required their
incumbents to work closely with litigants and other outsiders. Notable in this regard
were the examiners. They could be permanently retained by the forum or commis-
sioned for specific tasks. They were usually British, but if the nature of the suit
necessitated linguistic or technical skills not found among the local European com-
munity, the individual’s religion or ethnicity did not seem to matter as along as he
was equal to the task. Examiners were employed to question and take down the
responses of witnesses “agreeable to the list delivered by the attorney.”47 Procedure
required the list of questions and witnesses to be authorised by the forum and
recorded by the register before official consent for the interrogation was granted.48
The interrogation proper could only start once the witness had sworn upon the oath
appropriate to his religion. If the witness were sick, the examiner would question
him at his home.49
Examiners were regularly accompanied by interpreters. Given the diversity char-
acteristic of maritime Asia, they were critical to the smooth running of the forum in
the frequent situations where its employees and others involved in the case did not
have a language in common. The languages most often used as a lingua franca in
Bombay were Portuguese and Gujarati.50 Despite their obvious significance, the
details that we have about interpreters is scanty. It is probable that, like examiners,
they were commissioned by the register. The chances are that they belonged to
local communities known for their linguistic—and scribal—skills, and were often
tapped for these by those from abroad. From the Mayor’s Court’s standpoint, their
main task was to translate into English papers deposed by the plaintiffs and defen-
dants. These were then written up at the register’s behest and later perused by the
judges on the bench. It is unlikely that the forum assumed official responsibility for
finding and hiring interpreters to mediate between clients and their attorneys.
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Where language was an issue, it was up to the individuals concerned to find for
themselves an interpreter. Most likely, he would be drawn from the same pool on
which the Mayor’s Court itself depended.51
Finally, the Mayor’s Court needed an assortment of individuals to execute and
enforce its orders and judgements in situations where there might be need for
recourse to physical force. The most important of these were the sheriff, the gaol
keeper of the prison, the sheriff’s sergeant and the marshall of the court. The latter
two seem to have been permanent employees of the forum and were answerable to
it alone. Delivered their orders by the register, the sergeant and marshall were
responsible for serving precepts or warrants of summons, arrest, and sequestra-
tion.52 The forum does not appear to have exercised full authority over the sheriff
and gaol keeper, though for obvious reasons they worked in tandem. In return for
a payment, the sheriff would accept the commissions from the Mayor’s Court,
drawn up and issued by the register. The register would typically instruct him to
enforce the sale of goods and the recovery of sums decreed by the bench; to exe-
cute precepts of summons or arrest, of sequestration or attachment; and to make
inventories or appraisements. Together with the gaol keeper, he also received fees
for holding in prison those found in breach of the forum’s will.53
Alongside revealing something of the Mayor’s Court’s organisation, its tables of
fees give insights into the costs incurred by litigants whose disputes were adjudicat-
ed by it. “In every suit or action brought before them [the judges] and whereupon
they come to an actual judgement or decree,” the Mayor’s Court earned a commis-
sion of 5 per cent “on the amount of sum or value of the property decreed upon.”54
As part of its final decree, the bench would specify who was to be held liable for the
fees, whether to be shared in some fashion, in equal proportion or otherwise, or to
be paid wholly by one of the parties. The full legal costs could be quite large,
amounting to Rs. 100 or more. For this reason, much of the forum’s business dealt
with litigation where the capital at the heart of the dispute was worth at least sever-
al hundred rupees. The Diary indicates that frequently several thousand rupees
were at stake, astronomical sums for the period. Of course, these tables of fees only
tell us about the official costs imposed on litigants. We may presume that there
were an array of other costs, euphemistically termed “presents” or “gifts,” given in
cash or in kind.55 These would have been levied by key figures in the forum, with-
out which it is unlikely a case could have been prosecuted effectively. While we can-
not specify their value with certainty, it is probable that they formed a significant
fraction of the total expense borne by litigants. At the same time, they were not so
great as to deter maritime Asia’s shipowners, merchants, and bankers from seek-
ing the forum’s justice.
Procedural Matters
As already noted, the applicable procedures could be crucial in determining the
outcome of a suit. There existed numerous scholarly treatises and reams of official
pronouncements in which so-called correct procedure was detailed. But these were
generally ignored by the Mayor’s Court. For this reason, a more telling method for
recapturing the procedures actually employed by the forum is to study the actions
of its officials and servants, and of the parties to the case and their attorneys. In the
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disputes that I have examined, three procedural aspects dominate all others: the
tendency for boundaries between distinct transactions to be blurred; the inquiry to
determine the facts underlying the dispute; and the use of attachments and physi-
cal force to compel litigants to abide by the forum’s decrees.
Interlinked Transactions
It was commonplace for disputes rooted in one transaction to engulf others that
were technically separate from it.56 This was especially true of situations where there
was overlap between parties to different transactions and where transactions imme-
diately followed upon each other. The fact that the Mayor’s Court did not take deci-
sive steps to prevent this blurring is evidence for its tacit acquiescence in the
practice. It also suggests that it tended to interpret a dispute in the context of the
overall relationship between the litigants; it did not confine itself to just the specific
venture that was its proximate cause. If one of the parties was adjudged to have
broken his moral duties towards the other, even where the terms of their agreement
had been formally observed, the aggrieved party might seek compensation by lay-
ing a claim on the proceeds from another transaction in which both had a stake.
Such instances throw into relief the challenges faced by the Mayor’s Court in strik-
ing a suitable balance between the sanctity of a contract and the often unstated
moral obligations of individuals towards one another. This gave rise to a situation in
which, notwithstanding prior agreements and the motivations of those involved, the
fates of distinct ventures could not be fully disentangled from each other.
Contemporaries would have been well aware of this reality before sealing their
agreement; it influenced their negotiating strategy and their general approach to
future transactions.
The Mayor’s Court possessed several mechanisms for signalling its views on the
relative weight it gave to formal agreements and moral responsibilities in reaching
its decision. These were necessary in order to inject predictability into the process
of dispute resolution. The most effective mechanism was rooted in the notion that
certain kinds of debts were “superior” or “inferior” to others. This established a hier-
archy of debts, helping judges to determine which of the competing claims had pri-
ority in complex suits. A typical inferior debt was “due by simple contract.” This was
trumped by superior debts resulting from, say, “bonds or covenant.”57 Though it
seems reasonable to claim that the hierarchy was well-known in view of the densi-
ty of the networks to which those concerned belonged and their propensity to cir-
culate and exchange useful information, this does not mean that it was static; on
the contrary, there were continuous pressures for change. The hierarchy was ulti-
mately sanctioned by the “judgements and decrees” issued by the Mayor’s Court,
which also formed a channel through which modifications were publicised. An
example of this was the elevation of certain kinds of debt, sometimes up to “the
highest rank,” so that they would be paid off sooner than would have expected
beforehand.58
This shows that the Mayor’s Court could in principle try to alter, or even overturn,
widely-held customs. During the decades of its existence, however, it seldom exer-
cised this power. And when it did so, it was done with considerable reluctance. This
could have been one of the reasons underlying its reputation for consistency. But
litigants were not deterred. If it could further own personal interests, they would
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persist in urging the forum to modify prevailing customs. This was one of the
tactics deployed by Rupji Dhanji in the late 1760s in a dispute between him and a
group of a Bombay-based creditors over a ship leased for a commercial voyage to
Basra.59
Determining the Facts of the Case
Central to the prosecution of a suit in the Mayor’s Court was the investigation of the
claims made by the litigants and the discovery of the facts underlying the dispute.
This was carried out over several stages. As in English common law and equity
courts, the responsibility for making the inquiry was not the forum’s. Rather, it lay
with the plaintiff and defendant, and their attorneys. It was they who had to find the
evidence to support their respective claims and present it to the forum. The main
role of the judges was to evaluate the conflicting evidence and ensure correct pro-
cedures were obeyed.
Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by the judges was to determine the authen-
ticity and reliability of the evidence presented to them by the litigants. Of course,
this evidence had to be comprehensible to them, and so it was a formally required
that all depositions, statements and other documents handed over to the register
be in English or, if originally in another language, be accompanied by their English
translations. A partial exception was made for documents in Portuguese, which
were sometimes accepted as exhibited.60 Once the linguistic barriers had been over-
come, the importance given to documentary evidence by the judges depended cru-
cially on whether they believed they had been composed by the purported author.
This is why witnesses “acquainted with the proper character & hand-writing” of that
individual would be asked to confirm that the documents exhibited had actually
been written by him.61 Of course, the witnesses themselves had to be credible. Care
was taken to ensure that those selected had close ties to the author and knew the
language in which the original documents were written. In practice, this meant that
they often belonged to the same community as the author himself. Armenian mer-
chants, for example, would be preferred as witnesses in a dispute that involved
documents in Armenian.62 Curiously, even in cases where this was not possible, and
witnesses openly admitted their ignorance of the language of the documents, they
could still be asked to identify their authorship.63
Once the Mayor’s Court had agreed to hear a suit, the inquiry to determine the
facts was conducted over two stages. In the first, the plaintiff or petitioner deposed
a relatively brief statement. This normally set out the complaint, providing some
details on the context that gave rise to it. The defendant was then invited to
respond. He invariably used the opportunity to refute the allegations made against
him. This could be done by offering an alternative version of the events and rebut-
ting the specific details in the complaint. Frequently, he would also make counter-
allegations that contradicted key aspects of the plaintiff’s case. There followed an
ordered exchange of depositions between the two sides, in the form of statement-
and-response. The forum acted as an intermediary, receiving the depositions and
passing them on to the other party, with a request for an answer and further com-
ments, if any. Documents noted in the depositions, such as accounts, contracts,
bonds, and correspondence, would usually be appended as exhibits. This exchange
was generally allowed to continue until no more new facts, claims, or arguments
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were forthcoming. With this, the end of the first stage of the inquiry was reached.
The litigation now proceeded to the second stage, the discovery stage. This was
intended to unearth new details about the case that might help the judges decide
which of the contending views was closer to the truth. The disputes that I have
examined suggests this occurred in one of two ways. The more common was for
statements to be entered by witnesses and for witnesses to be interrogated by the
forum’s examiner in accordance with a list of predefined questions. This was sub-
ject to the condition that plaintiffs and defendants could not be called as witness-
es. Of course, for the interrogations to take place, the witnesses had to be present
in a place where the forum exercised authority. The second way required the
Mayor’s Court to issue a writ, variously termed a “bill of enquiry”64 or “bill of dis-
covery,”65 at the instigation of one of the parties. The litigant making this petition
would typically argue he “cannot prove and make the several truths,”66 “with that
clearness and certainty he could wish and define,”67 except through direct question-
ing of the other parties to the suit. He hoped to elicit “ample testimony or make out
the truth of the premises so fully and clearly as by [their] confession.”68 This option
was particularly useful in situations where one side was unable to call in its support
witnesses who had, say, “gone beyond seas or to places far remote and unknown”
to them.69 As before, the writ specified the names of those that the litigant wanted
to be interrogated and the questions he wished them to answer.
The procedure embodied in this writ was “commonly” found in the forums that
constituted maritime Asia’s legal regime. This helps accounts for its popularity
among litigants. Babu Lambatia, a Muslim defendant, claimed in 1747 that the writ
would allow one of the co-defendants in his case, Muh.ammad Isma¯‘ i¯l, to be inter-
rogated. Otherwise, being formally barred from answering questions by virtue of the
condition just noted, he would be prevented from giving evidence even though he
was “the greatest if not the sole actor in the affair.”70 If the Mayor’s Court did not
issue this writ, then Babu Lambatia “must undoubtedly be deprived of his just
right.”71 But perhaps the most compelling argument in favour of Babu Lambatia’s
request was the possibility that the plaintiff had named Muh.ammad Isma¯‘ i¯l as a
party to the suit in order to prevent him from giving “regular evidence at the exam-
ination of witnesses.”72 “If the bills of enquiry would not be against such persons
after having been made parties by a complainant,” he continued, “it would always
be in the power of any person who had arrived to complain to deprive a defend[an]t
of any or all his witnesses, which he knew, were material by making them partys to
the suit. Which if admitted would be an infallible way of vanquishing demands to
the great detriment of others.”73
A signal feature of official interrogations was the oath. The answers given were
not deemed valid by the forum without previously have been “sworn to upon
oath.”74 Given the diversity that marked those active in the trading world of the
Indian Ocean rim, the Mayor’s Court displayed a flexible attitude towards oaths; wit-
nesses were allowed to choose one from among “several...corporal oathes.”75 By
allowing witnesses a choice, the Mayor Court sought to accommodate differing reli-
gious traditions. But the choice was not entirely free of constraints, and this occa-
sionally caused difficulties. The issue cropped up in the 1747 dispute mentioned
above. The oath became a bone of contention when the Muslim defendants, Babu
Lambatia and Muh.ammad Isma¯‘ i¯l, petitioned the court for a “Bill of Discovery.”
SOVEREIGN JUSTICE IN PRECOLONIAL MARITIME ASIA 63
Their Hindu opponent, Ram Bhawani Shankar, complained this was merely a ruse
on their part; the defendants, far from being interested in establishing the truth of
the matter, were trying to take advantage of the fact that his religious tradition pre-
vented him from answering “upon the oath then required in order to confound and
distress this complainant and prevent his pursuing his just right.”76 Because of this
constraint imposed by his tradition, Ram Bhawani Shankar was not able to respond
to the questions stated in the writ and so could not make his case. As the other
individual named in the writ, a Muslim opponent of the Hindu plaintiff, laboured
under no such constraint, he argued that Babu Lambatia’s petition was manifestly
unjust.
Enforcing the Judges’ Will
The mechanisms available to the Mayor’s Court to compel litigants to behave in a
certain fashion were few in number, and those that were available were crude and
inflexible. There was an obvious need for such mechanisms because of the reluc-
tance expressed by some litigants to conform to the judges’ will. Alongside incen-
tives to encourage compliance, punitive measures were essential for the forum to
maintain its credibility among those who fell under its potential jurisdiction. The
chief goal was to make the costs of non-compliance so prohibitive that all parties
would abide by its procedures and its decisions. They were intended to dissuade lit-
igants from fleeing the territory over which the forum had sway or, for those who
resided elsewhere, to compel them to submit themselves to its authority. They
ensured that litigants remained committed to its proceedings once the case had
been taken up by the forum. And they acted as a guarantee that the parties would
obey the terms of the final judgement.
Of the mechanisms that forum could call upon, the most extreme was imprison-
ment of the recalcitrant individual. The Mayor’s Court would deploy bailiffs, a sher-
iff, or armed peons when force was deemed appropriate. Recourse to such brute
force, however, was usually a last resort. Much more commonplace was the use of
writs or precepts of attachment against the property of the named individual. These
could be issued at any stage of the suit prior to the final judgement, and could spec-
ify any form of property to be attached as long as it had liquid value. It seems that
an order for an attachment could only be given after one of the parties had official-
ly requested it. The usual justification proffered was the high likelihood of a litigant
escaping Bombay and leaving behind insufficient assets to cover any decision that
went against him. If he were already beyond the forum’s reach but had property in
Bombay, it was normally argued that the chances of the property being spirited
away were sufficiently high that it ought to be attached forthwith. Such was Sundar
Varanasi’s concern. In 1767, he asked the Mayor’s Court “to lay an attachment
on the house of said Mooty Amersung [Moti Amar Singh] in order to discharge
your petitioners just debt, as your petitioner is informed...Mooty Amersung is
going to mortgage it to another person to the great hurt and detriment of your peti-
tioner.”77
More rarely, attachments were used to compel defendants to return to the
forum’s jurisdiction and face the plaintiff’s allegations. This was the strategy adopt-
ed by a group of Bombay-based freighters who wanted compensation from their
insurers for their cargo, which had been seized by pirates in the late 1730s from the
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vessel (a shybar) carrying it while sailing off the west coast of India. The dispute was
first submitted to arbitration by an occupational forum headed by the “principal
merchants.” They “unanimously agreed that the said shybar should be included in
the remaining part of the cargo as salvage towards the whole cargo.” But the own-
ers of the vessel, on being informed of the arbitrators’ decision, refused to come to
Bombay. In order to encourage them to do so and “justify, if they can, why their shy-
bar should not be included in the salvage,” the freighters petitioned the Mayor’s
Court to attach their vessel, which was currently anchored in Bombay’s harbour.
The court acceded to their demand and issued a precept of attachment.78
Attachments could be on fixed or moveable property. On a writ being served, the
property in question could not be sold or, if applicable, transported without the
Mayor’s Court’s express consent. Despite its popularity as a means of enforcing its
will, the procedures for announcing and enacting attachments were haphazard. In
particular, the ordering of claims was not always properly defined or publicised in
an effective manner. The result could be confusion, with disputes being further
complicated and prolonged. This was the experience of Boya Miah ‘Abd al-Rah.man.
He was sent to Bombay in 1738 by his employer, H.a¯j i¯ Baqi¯l, to purchase a vessel.
The journey had been preceded by extensive discussions with the brokers acting on
behalf of its present owner. The deal had been effectively agreed, or so H.a¯j i¯ Baqi¯l
thought, when Boya Miah ‘Abd al-Rah.man set off for Bombay to inspect the vessel
and sign the contract. Imagine Boya Miah ‘Abd al-Rah.man’s dismay when on arrival
he discovered that the vessel had been attached because of a prior claim on it and
thus could not be sold until that dispute was settled.79
Conclusion
In a narrow sense, this article has been about the Mayor’s Court of Bombay, a forum
in which sovereign justice was dispensed between 1728 and 1798. The foregoing
pages give a detailed account of those aspects concerned with the resolution of dis-
putes: the forum’s founding charters; its jurisdiction in practice and the substantive
laws that were actually invoked; its relationship to other forums; the status and roles
of its officials and employees; and the procedural matters that shaped the outcome
of a suit. Occupying as it did centre stage in Bombay’s governing apparatus in the
eighteenth century, the Mayor’s Court is a noteworthy thread in the fabric of the pre-
colonial history of the port city and its surrounding polity, an element in the story of
European expansion in early modern times, and part of the loosely defined system
that was global in reach and nominally managed by Europe’s chartered trading
companies. The forum may be usefully articulated within each of these frameworks
and in so doing has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the perti-
nent fields. But there is one other framework within which the Mayor’s Court of
Bombay may be articulated. And that is the one which has been stressed in the
present article. As the port city became a prominent regional hub for trade, finance,
intelligence, transport and insurance in the course of the eighteenth century, its
Mayor’s Court gained significance as a sovereign forum in the legal regime span-
ning much of the interconnected world of the Indian Ocean rim. It follows that
recapturing the realities of litigation within it is relevant for our understanding of the
character and function of sovereign justice in precolonial maritime Asia.
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One of the main points I have sought to highlight in this article is that there
remain considerable areas of ignorance in our knowledge of the Mayor’s Court of
Bombay and, more generally, of maritime Asia’s legal regime. This is certainly true
of the many communal and occupational forums in which the great majority of dis-
putes would have been heard and resolved. But this ignorance extends as well to
other sovereign forums akin to the Mayor’s Court of Bombay—the courts of the
ruler of Aceh and the Relação de Goa under the Portuguese come to mind—and
which presumably are relatively well documented in the surviving historical record.
Such basic limitations in the current state of our knowledge constrain what sense
we can make of the past of Asia and the Middle East. As formal means for the res-
olution of disputes were essential for the existence of maritime Asia, our ignorance
of its legal regime vitiates our ability to perceive it. Moreover, because the decentred
quality of maritime Asia made it particularly sensitive to the consolidation of
Europe’s modern global empires in the nineteenth century,80 our ignorance also
impedes our ability to elucidate the continuities and changes ushered in under the
press of these empires in Asia and the Middle East. Thus, sharpening our sense of
the realities of the legal regime that prevailed in maritime Asia in what was in retro-
spect the last moment before the process of colonisation became unstoppable con-
tributes to the establishment of a baseline. Though this baseline remains very much
a work-in-progress, we need to keep at it because it holds out the promise of a
firmer purchase on the impact of later European dominance and imperialism.81
But that is not all. Detailed knowledge of maritime Asia’s legal regime and, in
particular, of its sovereign forums under European control may also help us gain a
firmer purchase on the specific mechanisms by which this impact was realised. I
posit that some of the seeds which would later grow into and buttress state-spon-
sored colonial law were laid with the Mayor’s Court of Bombay. Though this forum
was abolished in 1798, it familiarised those residing in Bombay, as well as those in
settlements in western India, the Arabian Sea area and beyond, to sovereign justice
dispensed under British auspices. In effect, those who belonged to communities
indigenous to the region became habituated to this and similar forums manned by
Europeans.
This development would have profound and unintended consequences. Many of
those who acknowledged the forum’s justice and treated it as a useful resource con-
tinued to do so even as the legal regime of which the Mayor’s Court of Bombay had
been part in the eighteenth century was transformed out of all recognition. Most
salient in this transformation was, on the one hand, the diminished status, or dis-
appearance, of previously comparable sovereign forums that had not been under
European control, like the court of the na¯’ib of Ottoman Basra and the ‘Ada¯lat
court in Nawabi Surat, and, on the other hand, the increasing monopolisation of
sovereign justice by a state-centred colonial polity. In parallel with this, the funda-
mental nature of this justice was being changed; without disavowing the impor-
tance of personal attributes, it became increasingly territorial and confined to its
subjects under the aegis of a framework in which legal pluralism was not just
acknowledged but embraced. Forums were now situated in a partial hierarchy and
applied a law—often purportedly traditional or customary—that was codified after
having been “discovered” or “invented.” From the perspective of the nineteenth
century, then, the Mayor’s Court of Bombay may be interpreted as a channel for
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facilitating the later absorption and institutionalisation of novel, frequently alien,
imports. By this interpretation, the Mayor’s Court, along with other sovereign
forums presided over by Europeans in the eighteenth century, served to direct the
history of Asia and the Middle East onto a new trajectory.
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